



# SNIP: Speculative Execution and Non-Interference Preservation for Compiler Transformations



Your binaries are haunted by your compiler!


Sören van der Wall, Roland Meyer, POPL 2025, Denver

then  $[ \cdot ] \models \text{SNIP}$



# Speculative Execution

SpectreV1






# Speculative Execution



SpectreV1

Architecture



# Speculative Execution






SpectreV1

Architecture

→ Prog Counter  
**Registers**  
Stack vars

$\mu$ -Architecture

Caches  
Reorder Buffer  
Branch predictor




# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



```
if (i < size){  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[a];  
}
```



Registers  
Stack Variables

# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



```
→ if (i < size){  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[a];  
}
```

i : 20	size: 8
	sec : 42

Registers  
Stack Variables

# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



```
→ if (i20 < 8size) {  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[a];  
}
```

i : 20	size: 8
	sec : 42


Registers  
Stack Variables

# Speculative Execution


# SpectreV1



```
if (i < size){  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[a];  
}
```



i : 20	size: 8
	sec : 42




Registers  
Stack Variables

# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



```
if (i < size){  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[a];  
}
```




i : 20	size: 8
	sec : 42



Registers  
Stack Variables

# Speculative Execution


# SpectreV1



Registers  
Stack Variables

# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1




# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



→ if (i < size){  
    a = buf[i];  
    \_ = buf2[a];  
}

$\&\text{buf} + 20 = \&\text{sec}$



Registers  
Stack Variables

# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



```
→ if (i < size){  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[a];  
}
```

Side-Channel  
Leakage



$\&\text{buf} + 20 = \&\text{sec}$



Registers  
Stack Variables

# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



```
→ if (i < size) {  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[a];  
}
```

Side-Channel  
Leakage



BR false

$\&\text{buf} + 20 = \&\text{sec}$



Registers  
Stack Variables

# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



```
→ if (i < size) {  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[a];  
}
```

Side-Channel  
Leakage



BR false

LD 20

$\&\text{buf} + 20 = \&\text{sec}$



Registers  
Stack Variables

# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



```
→ if (i < size) {  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[ua];  
}
```

## Side-Channel Leakage



BR false

LD 20

LD 42

$\&\text{buf} + 20 = \&\text{sec}$



Registers  
Stack Variables



Branch-Prediction: Non-Det!

```
→ if (i < size) {  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[ua];  
}
```

Side-Channel  
Leakage

BR false

LD 20

LD 42

$\&\text{buf} + 20 = \&\text{sec}$



Registers  
Stack Variables

# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



Micro-Arch  
Directive



Branch-Prediction: Non-Det!

```
→ if (i < size) {  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[a];  
}
```

$\&\text{buf} + 20 = \&\text{sec}$



Registers  
Stack Variables



Side-Channel  
Leakage

BR false

LD 20

LD 42

# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



## Micro-Arch Directive

miss



## Branch-Prediction: Non-Det!

```
→ if (i < size) {  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[ua];  
}
```

$\&\text{buf} + 20 = \&\text{sec}$



Registers  
Stack Variables

## Side-Channel Leakage

BR false

LD 20

LD 42



# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



## Micro-Arch Directive

miss

oob **sec**



## Branch-Prediction: Non-Det!

```
→ if (i < size) {  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[ua];  
}
```

$$\&\text{buf} + 20 = \&\text{sec}$$



## Side-Channel Leakage

BR false

LD 20

LD 42



Registers  
Stack Variables

# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



## Micro-Arch Directive

miss

oob **sec**

step



## Branch-Prediction: Non-Det!

```
→ if (i < size) {  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[a];  
}
```

$$\&\text{buf} + 20 = \&\text{sec}$$



Registers  
Stack Variables

## Side-Channel Leakage

BR false

LD 20

LD 42



# Speculative Execution

# SpectreV1



## Micro-Arch Directive

miss  
oob sec  
step

Removes Non-Det!



Branch-Prediction: Non-Det!

```
→ if (i < size) {  
    a = buf[i];  
    _ = buf2[a];  
}
```

&buf + 20 = &sec



Registers  
Stack Variables

## Side-Channel Leakage

BR false  
LD 20  
LD 42



# Speculative Execution



Directive:Leakage



## Directive

miss

oob sec

step



```
if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    _ = buf2[a];
```

## Leakage

BR false

LD 20

LD 42



# Speculative Execution



Directive:Leakage




## Directive

miss

oob sec

step

```
if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    _ = buf2[a];
```




## Leakage

BR false

LD 20

LD 42



Directive

# Speculative Execution



Directive:Leakage




## Directive

miss

oob sec

step

```
if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    _ = buf2[a];
```



## Leakage

BR false

LD 20

LD 42



# Speculative Execution



Directive:Leakage



## Directive

miss

oob sec

step


```
if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    _ = buf2[a];
```

## Leakage

BR false

LD 20

LD 42



# Speculative Execution



Directive:Leakage



## Directive

miss

oob sec

step


```
if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    _ = buf2[a];
```

## Leakage

BR false

LD 20

LD 42



# Speculative Execution



Directive:Leakage



## Directive

miss

oob sec

step



```
if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    _ = buf2[a];
```

## Leakage

BR false


LD 20

LD 42




# S Non-Interference

Proving




# S Non-Interference



```
i : 20 size : 8  
sec : 42
```


# S Non-Interference




public  
secret




# S Non-Interference



public  
secret




# S Non-Interference



$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{I}}}$

**IF**

# S Non-Interference




$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{w}}}$

**IF**

$$\forall d \in \text{Dir}^* : \quad S_1 = S_2$$

The equation shows a universal quantifier  $\forall$  followed by a domain  $d \in \text{Dir}^*$ . To the right is a colon. After the colon, there is a mathematical equality  $=$  between two terms enclosed in boxes. Each term consists of a variable  $S_1$  or  $S_2$  preceded by a small box containing the word "secret" in red and "public" in blue.

# S Non-Interference



$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{wavy}}}$

**IF**

$\forall d \in \text{Dir}^*$

$S_1 = S_2$

$S_2$

•

$S_1$

◻

secret

public

$l : p$

$\Updownarrow$

$S_2$

◻

secret

public

$l : p$

# SNI Preservation

SNIP

[ . ] : Compiler Pass

# SNI Preservation

SNIP

$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{a}}}$

[ . ] : Compiler Pass

# SNI Preservation

SNIP

$$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\alpha}} \implies [P] \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\alpha}}$$

[ . ] : Compiler Pass

# SNI Preservation

SNIP

[ . ]  $\models$  SNIP

IF  $\forall P \quad P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{a}}}$   $\implies [P] \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{a}}}$

[ . ] : Compiler Pass

$$P \models \mathbf{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{and}}} \implies [P] \models \mathbf{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{and}}}$$

$$P \models \mathbf{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{and}}} \xrightarrow{?} [P]_{\text{ra}} \models \mathbf{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{and}}}$$

$$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$$

$\xrightarrow{?}$

$$[P]_{\text{ra}} \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$$

`fn( publicind, secretsec, public... )`

```
if (b < size)
buf[b] = sec;
```

```
_ = buf[ind]
```

$$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$$

$\xrightarrow{?}$

$$[P]_{\text{ra}} \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$$

fn( <sup>public</sup>ind, <sup>secret</sup>sec, <sup>public</sup>... )

```
if (b < size)
    buf[_b] = sec;
```

\_ = buf[\_ind]

$$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$$

```
fn( publicind, secretsec, public... )  
if (b < size)  
buf[b] = sec;  
_ = buf[ind]
```

$$\xrightarrow{?} [P]_{\text{ra}} \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$$


```
fn( publicind, secretsec, public... )  
stk = ind;  
if (b < size)  
buf[b] = sec;  
ind = stk;  
_ = buf2[ind]
```

$$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$$

```
fn( publicind, secretsec, public... )  
if (b < size)  
buf[b] = sec;  
_ = buf[ind]
```

~~→~~  $[P]_{\text{ra}} \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$

```
fn( publicind, secretsec, public... )  
stk = ind;  
if (b < size)  
buf[b] = sec;  
ind = stk;  
_ = buf2[ind]
```





$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$

```
fn( publicind, secretsec, public... )  
if (b < size)  
buf[b] = sec;  
_ = buf[ind]
```

~~→~~  $[P]_{\text{ra}} \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$

```
fn( publicind, secretsec, public... )  
step   stk = ind;  
miss   if (b < size)  
oob   stk   buf[b] = sec;  
step   ind = stk;  
step   _ = buf2[ind]
```






ind : 0	b : 20	size : 8
sec : 42		

$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$

```
fn( publicind, secretsec, public... )  
if (b < size)  
buf[b] = sec;  
_ = buf[ind]
```

~~→~~  $[P]_{\text{ra}} \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$

```
step      stk = ind;  
miss     if (b < size)  
oob  stk  buf[b] = sec;  
step     ind = stk;  
step     _ = buf2[ind]
```



ind : 0	b : 20	size : 8
sec : 42		stk : 0

$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$

fn( <sup>public</sup>ind, <sup>secret</sup>sec, <sup>public</sup>... )


if (b < size)  
buf[b] = sec;

\_ = buf[ind]


~~→~~ [P]<sub>ra</sub>  $\models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$

fn( <sup>public</sup>ind, <sup>secret</sup>sec<sup>42</sup>, <sup>public</sup>... )

step      stk = ind;  
miss      if (b < size)  
oob      buf[b] =<sub>42</sub> sec;  
step      ind = stk;  
step      \_ = buf2[ind]



ind : 0	b : 20	size : 8
sec : 42		stk : 42



$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$

fn( <sup>public</sup>ind, <sup>secret</sup>sec, <sup>public</sup>... )

if (b < size)  
buf[b] = sec;

\_ = buf[ind]


~~→~~ [P]<sub>ra</sub>  $\models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$

fn( <sup>public</sup>ind, <sup>secret</sup>sec<sup>42</sup>, <sup>public</sup>... )

step      stk = ind;  
miss      if (b < size)  
oob      buf[b] =<sub>42</sub> sec;  
step      ind =<sub>42</sub> stk;  
step      \_ = buf2[ind]



ind : 0	b : 20	size : 8
sec : 42		stk : 42




$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$ 

```

fn( publicind, secretsec, public... )
if (b < size)
buf[b] = sec;
_ = buf[ind]

```

~~→~~

 $[P]_{\text{ra}} \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{ind}}}$ 


```

fn( publicind, secretsec42, public... )
step   stk = ind;
miss   if (b < size)
oob   stk   buf[b] =42 sec;
step   ind =42 stk;
step   _ = buf2[ind] LD 42

```

ind : 42	b : 20	size : 8
sec : 42		stk : 42

**LLVM**  $\not\models$  **SNIP**

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Each of LLVM's 4 allocators!

**LLVM**  $\not\models$  **SNIP**

Each of LLVM's 4 allocators!

Slightly modified libsodium code!

# Goals

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*How do we prove*

[ . ]  $\models$  **SNIP** ?

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*Can we **fix** Register Allocation so that*

$[.]_{\text{ra}} \models \text{SNIP} ?$

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*How do we prove*

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# SNI Preservation

**DeadCode**

# SNI Preservation

**DeadCode**

[ . ]<sub>dc</sub> ⊨ SNIP

# **SNH** Preservation Safety

**DeadCode**

[ . ]<sub>dc</sub> ⊨ **SNIP**

**SNI** Preservation

Safety

**DeadCode**

Safety

 $P$ 

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
ret;
```

$P$ 

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec)
if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
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 $[P]_{dc}$ 

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec)
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    nop;
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Safety

 $P$ 

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 $[P]_{dc}$ 

```
fn( publici, size, secretsec)
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```

 $\gamma$

Safety

 $P$ 

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
if (i < size)
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a = 0;
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```

Equal except on  
dead locations

 $[P]_{dc}$ 

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
Safety

 $P$ 

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fn( public i, size, secret sec)
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    a = 0;
ret;
```

i : 4	size : 8
a : 15	sec : 42

Equal except on  
dead locations

 $[P]_{dc}$ 

```
fn( public i, size, secret sec)
if (i < size)
    nop;
    a = 0;
ret;
```

i : 4	size : 8
a : 11	sec : 42

Safety

 $P$ 

```
fn( public i, size, secret sec)
if (i < size)
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    a = 0;
ret;
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i : 4	size : 8
a : 15	sec : 42

 $[P]_{dc}$ 

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fn( public i, size, secret sec)
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Equal except on  
dead locations

i : 4	size : 8
a : 11	sec : 42

i : 4	size : 8
a : 0	sec : 42

Safety

 $P$ 

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
$i : 4 \ size : 8$   
 $a : 0 \ sec : 42$

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fn( public i, size, secret sec)
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
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 $[P]_{dc}$ 



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Equal except on  
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





$\gamma$





$\gamma$


$[P]$











# **SNH** Preservation

Safety

Correctness


**Theorem** *If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\succ$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that*

# ~~SN~~ Preservation

Correctness

Safety

**Theorem** *If [ . ] has a simulation  $\succ$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that*




# ~~SN~~ Preservation

Correctness

Safety

**Theorem** *If [.] has a simulation  $\succ$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that*




*then for any safety property  $A$ :*  $P \models A \implies [P] \models A$

# ~~SN~~ Preservation

Correctness

Safety

**Theorem** *If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\succ$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that*



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Usually,  $\succ$  is parametric in  $P$


# ~~SN~~ Preservation

Correctness

Safety

**Theorem** *If [.] has a simulation  $\succ$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that*

$P \models A$   
Not needed  
to construct  $\succ$



*then for any safety property  $A$ :*  $P \models A \implies [P] \models A$

Usually,  $\succ$  is parametric in  $P$

**SNH** Preservation

Safety

**DeadCode**

**SNH** Preservation

Safety

**DeadCode**



# **SNH** Preservation

Safety

Method

$P$



$[P]$



$\gamma$




$\gamma$



# SNH Preservation

Safety


Method



# SNH Preservation

Safety

Method



$P$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
  if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
ret;
```

$[P]_{dc}$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
  if (i < size)
    nop;
    a = 0;
ret;
```

$P$

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fn( public i, size, secretsec )
if (i < size)
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```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
→ if (i < size)
    nop;
    a = 0;
ret;
```

i	:	4
a	:	15
size	:	8
sec	:	42

Y

i	:	4
a	:	11
size	:	8
sec	:	42

$P$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
→ if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
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    nop;
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ret;
```

i : 4
a : 15
size : 8
sec : 42

γ

i : 4
a : 11
size : 8
sec : 42

Directive Leakage

$P$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec)
→ if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
ret;
```

$[P]_{dc}$

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fn( public i, size, secretsec)
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```

i	:	4
a	:	15
size	:	8
sec	:	42

γ

i	:	4
a	:	11
size	:	8
sec	:	42

Directive	Leakage
correct	BR true

$P$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
→ if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
ret;
```

$[P]_{dc}$

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fn( public i, size, secretsec )
if (i < size)
    nop;
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ret;
```

i	:	4
a	:	15
size	:	8
sec	:	42

γ

i	:	4
a	:	11
size	:	8
sec	:	42

Directive	Leakage
correct	BR true
step	

$P$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
→ if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
ret;
```

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```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
if (i < size)
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a = 0;
ret;
```

Directive Leakage

i : 4
a : 15
size : 8
sec : 42

i : 4
a : 11
size : 8
sec : 42

Directive Leakage

correct step  
BR true

$P$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
  if (i < size)
    → a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
  ret;
```

$[P]_{dc}$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
  if (i < size)
    nop;
    a = 0;
  ret;
```

### Directive Leakage

i : 4
a : 15
size : 8
sec : 42

correct BR true

### Directive Leakage

i : 4
a : 11
size : 8
sec : 42

correct BR true  
step

$P$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
  if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
  → a = 0;
  ret;
```

$[P]_{dc}$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
  if (i < size)
    nop;
  a = 0;
  ret;
```

Directive	Leakage
i : 4	
a : 15	correct BR true
size : 8	
sec : 42	step LD 4

Directive	Leakage
i : 4	
a : 11	correct BR true
size : 8	
sec : 42	step

$P$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
  if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
  → a = 0;
  ret;
```

$[P]_{dc}$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
  if (i < size)
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  a = 0;
  ret;
```

Directive	Leakage
i : 4	
a : 15	BR true
size : 8	
sec : 42	LD 4 ... ;

Directive	Leakage
i : 4	
a : 11	BR true
size : 8	
sec : 42	LD 4 ... ;


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


Directive	Leakage
i : 20 a : 15 size : 8 sec : 42	miss BR false

Directive	Leakage
i : 20 a : 11 size : 8 sec : 42	miss BR false

$P$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
  if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
  ret;
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$[P]_{dc}$

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fn( public i, size, secretsec )
  if (i < size)
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


Directive	Leakage
i : 20	BR false
a : 15	miss
size : 8	
sec : 42	

Directive	Leakage
i : 20	BR false
a : 11	miss
size : 8	step
sec : 42	

$P$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
  if (i < size)
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  a = 0;
ret;
```



$[P]_{dc}$

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


Directive	Leakage
i : 20	BR false
a : 15	miss
size : 8	LD 4
sec : 42	oob ...

Directive	Leakage
i : 20	BR false
a : 11	miss
size : 8	step
sec : 42	

$P$

```
fn( public i, size, secretsec )
  if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
  a = 0;
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$[P]_{dc}$

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fn( public i, size, secretsec )
  if (i < size)
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### Directive Leakage

	Directive	Leakage
i : 20		BR false
a : 15	miss	LD 4
size : 8	ioob ...	
sec : 42		

### Directive Leakage

	Directive	Leakage
i : 20		BR false
a : 11	miss	
size : 8	step	
sec : 42		






# **SNH** Preservation

**Method**

Safety

$P$

$[P]$









# SNH Preservation

Method

Safety

$P$

$[P]$




# SNH Preservation

Method


Safety

$P$

$[P]$




$\downarrow l : , p$




$\gamma$

$\leftarrow\!\!\!\leftarrow$

$\gamma$



$\downarrow l : , p$



**SNH** Preservation

Safety

**Method**

# **SNI Preservation**

**Method**

# SNI Preservation

Method

$[.] \models \text{SNIP}$

**IF**       $\forall P \quad P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\alpha}} \implies [P] \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\alpha}}$

## SNI Preservation

$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{A}}$

```
fn( publici, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
  ret;
```


## Method

```
fn( publici, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    nop;
    a = 0;
  ret;
```

## SNI Preservation

$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{A}}$

```
fn( publici, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
  ret;
```



$[P]_{dc} \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{A}}$

```
fn( publici, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    nop;
    a = 0;
  ret;
```


## Method

## SNI Preservation

## Method


$P \models \text{SNI}_\alpha$

```
fn(public i, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
  ret;
```



$[P]_{dc} \models \text{SNI}_\alpha$

```
fn(public i, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    nop;
    a = 0;
  ret;
```




## SNI Preservation

## Method


$P \models \text{SNI}_\alpha$

```
fn(public i, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
  ret;
```



$[P]_{dc} \models \text{SNI}_\alpha$

```
fn(public i, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    nop;
    a = 0;
  ret;
```



Directive

miss

step

step

Leakage


BR false

## SNI Preservation

## Method


$P \models \text{SNI}_\text{✓}$

```
fn(public i, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
  ret;
```



$[P]_{\text{dc}} \models \text{SNI}_\text{✗}$

```
fn(public i, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    nop;
    a = 0;
  ret;
```



Directive

miss

step

step

Leakage

BR false

BR false


## SNI Preservation

## Method

$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{A}}$

→ fn(<sup>public</sup>i, size, <sup>secret</sup>sec)  
if (i < size)  
    a = buf[i];  
    a = 0;  
ret;

Y: Equal up to  
dead locations




$\Rightarrow^{\approx}$

$[P]_{dc} \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{A}}$

fn(<sup>public</sup>i, size, <sup>secret</sup>sec)  
if (i < size)  
    nop;  
    a = 0;  
ret;

Y



Directive

miss  
step  
step

Leakage

BR false

BR false

## SNI Preservation

## Method

$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{red}}}$

```
→ fn(publici, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
  a = 0;
  ret;
```

$\gamma$ : Equal up to  
dead locations




$\Rightarrow^{\approx}$

$[P]_{dc} \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{red}}}$

```
fn(publici, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    nop;
  a = 0;
  ret;
```

$\gamma$



Leakage

Directive

miss  
step  
step

BR false

BR false


## SNI Preservation

## Method

$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{A}}$

```
→ fn(publici, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
  a = 0;
  ret;
```

$\gamma$ : Equal up to  
dead locations





$\Rightarrow^{\approx}$

$[P]_{dc} \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{A}}$

```
fn(publici, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    nop;
  a = 0;
  ret;
```

$\gamma$



Directive

miss  
step  
step

Leakage

BR false

BR false


## SNI Preservation

## Method

$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{A}}$

```
→ fn(publici, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
  a = 0;
  ret;
```

$\gamma$ : Equal up to  
dead locations





$\Rightarrow^{\approx}$

$[P]_{dc} \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{A}}$

```
→ fn(publici, size, secretsec)
  if (i < size)
    nop;
  a = 0;
  ret;
```

$\gamma$





Directive

miss  
step  
step

Leakage

BR false

BR false



## SNI Preservation

## Method


$P \models \text{SNI}_\text{✓}$

→ `fn(publici, size, secretsec)`

```

if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
ret;
```

Y: Equal up to  
dead locations




$[P]_{\text{dc}} \models \text{SNI}_\text{✓}$

→ `fn(publici, size, secretsec)`



```

if (i < size)
    nop;
    a = 0;
ret;
```



## Directive

miss



## Leakage

## Directive

miss

step

## Leakage

BR false

BR false

## SNI Preservation

## Method


$P \models \text{SNI}_\alpha$

→ `fn(publici, size, secretsec)`

```

if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
    a = 0;
ret;
```

$\gamma$ : Equal up to dead locations




$[P]_{dc} \models \text{SNI}_\alpha$

→ `fn(publici, size, secretsec)`


```

if (i < size)
    nop;
    a = 0;
ret;
```



## Directive

miss



$\uparrow^\gamma$  oob <sup>secret</sup>sec  
step

## Leakage

BR false

LD 20

## Directive

miss

step

step

## Leakage

BR false

BR false

## SNI Preservation

## Method


$P \models \text{SNI}_\alpha$

→ fn(<sub>public</sub>i, size, <sub>secret</sub>sec)

```

if (i < size)
    a = buf[i];
a = 0;
ret;
```

Y: Equal up to  
dead locations




$[P]_{dc} \models \text{SNI}_\alpha$

→ fn(<sub>public</sub>i, size, <sub>secret</sub>sec)


```

if (i < size)
    nop;
a = 0;
ret;
```



### Directive

miss



### Leakage

BR false      BR false

LD 20      LD 20

### Directive

miss

step

step

### Leakage

BR false

BR false

## SNI Preservation


## Method

$P \models SNI_{\cancel{a}}$

$[P] \models SNI_{\cancel{a}} ?$

**SNI Preservation**

$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{a}}}$




**Method**

$[P] \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{a}}}$  ?


## SNI Preservation

$P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{a}}$



$\gamma$

$\gamma$




## Method

$[P] \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{a}} ?$

## SNI Preservation


$P \models SNI_{\cancel{a}}$



$\gamma$

$\gamma$



## Method



$[P] \models SNI_{\cancel{a}}?$

## SNI Preservation


$P \models SNI_{\text{✓}}$



## Method


## SNI Preservation

$P \models SNI_{\cancel{a}}$




## Method

$[P] \models SNI_{\cancel{a}}$



## SNI Preservation

$P \models SNI_{\cancel{a}}$




## Method

$[P] \models SNI_{\cancel{a}}$

## SNI Preservation

$P \models SNI_{\cancel{a}}$




## Method


$[P] \models SNI_{\cancel{a}}$

## SNI Preservation

$P \models SNI_{\cancel{a}}$




## Method



$[P] \models SNI_{\cancel{a}}$

## SNI Preservation

$P \models SNI_{\cancel{a}}$




## Method

$[P] \models SNI_{\cancel{a}}$


## SNI Preservation

$P \models SNI_{\text{✓}}$




## Method


$[P] \models SNI_{\text{✗}}$




$\gamma$




$\gamma$



$\gamma$




$\gamma$




$\gamma$






# SNI Preservation



# Method



$P$




$\gamma$




# SNI Preservation

# Method




# SNI Preservation

# Method



# SNI Preservation

# Method




**??? = Same Program Counter ≡**

**Method**



**??? = Same Program Counter ≡**


**Method**



**???** = Same Program Counter ≡

**Method**



```
→ if ( i < size ) ←  
    a = buf[i];  
    a = 0;
```



??? = Same Program Counter ≡


Method

```
→ if ( i < size ) ←  
    a = buf[i];  
    a = 0;
```





# SNI Preservation

# Method




# SNI Preservation

# Method







Rely on Induction!



$[P]$

# SNI Preservation





# Method



$[P]$

# SNI Preservation

# Method



# SNI Preservation

**Correctness**

**Theorem** *If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\succ$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that*


&

*then*

# SNI Preservation

Correctness

**Theorem** *If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\gamma$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that*




then

# SNI Preservation

Correctness

**Theorem** If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\gamma$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that




then

# SNI Preservation

Correctness

**Theorem** If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\gamma$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that




then

$[.] \vdash SNIP$

# SNI Preservation

Correctness

**Theorem** If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\gamma$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that



$P \models \text{SNI}_{\text{red}}$   
Not needed!


then

$[.] \models \text{SNIP}$

# SNI Preservation

Correctness

**Theorem** If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\gamma$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that



$P \models \text{SNI}_{\text{red}}$   
Not needed!

then


$[.] \models \text{SNIP}$

Usually,  $\gamma$  is parametric in  $P$

# SNI Preservation

Proof Effort


**Theorem** If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\gamma$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that



# SNI Preservation

Proof Effort

**Theorem** If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\gamma$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that




Define  $\gamma$

# SNI Preservation

Proof Effort

**Theorem** If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\gamma$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that




Define  $\gamma$

Translate Directives

# SNI Preservation

Proof Effort

**Theorem** If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\gamma$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that



Define  $\gamma$


Translate Directives

Equal Source Leakage  $\rightarrow$  Equal Target Leakage

# SNI Preservation

Proof Effort

**Theorem** If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\gamma$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that



Define  $\gamma$

Translate Directives

Equal Source Leakage  $\rightarrow$  Equal Target Leakage

DeadCode




$[.]_{dc} \models SNIP$

# SNI Preservation

Proof Effort

**Theorem** If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\gamma$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that



Define  $\gamma$

Translate Directives

Equal Source Leakage  $\rightarrow$  Equal Target Leakage

DeadCode



RegAlloc




$[.]_{dc} \models SNIP$

# SNI Preservation

Proof Effort

**Theorem** If  $[.]$  has a simulation  $\gamma$  between any  $P$  and  $[P]$ , so that



Define  $\gamma$

Translate Directives

Equal Source Leakage  $\rightarrow$  Equal Target Leakage

DeadCode



$[.]_{dc} \models SNIP$

RegAlloc



$[.]_{ra} \not\models SNIP$

# Goals

*How do we prove*

$[.] \models \text{SNIP} ?$

*Can we fix Register Allocation so that*

$[.]_{\text{ra}} \models \text{SNIP} ?$


# Goals

How do we prove

$[ \cdot ] \models \text{SNIP} ?$

$\gamma$

then



Can we fix Register Allocation so that

$[ \cdot ]_{\text{ra}} \models \text{SNIP} ?$


# Goals

*How do we prove*

$[.] \models \text{SNIP}?$



*then*




$[.] \models \text{SNIP}$

*Can we fix Register Allocation so that*

# PriSC


$[.]_{\text{ra}} \models \text{SNIP}?$


**SNIP: Speculative Execution and Non-Interference  
Preservation for Compiler Transformations**  
[s.van-der-wall@tu-bs.de](mailto:s.van-der-wall@tu-bs.de)





**SNIP: Speculative Execution and Non-Interference  
Preservation for Compiler Transformations**  
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


**SNIP: Speculative Execution and Non-Interference  
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[s.van-der-wall@tu-bs.de](mailto:s.van-der-wall@tu-bs.de)






**SNIP**  
 $P \models SNI_{\cancel{d}}$   $\implies [P] \models SNI_{\cancel{d}}$




**SNIP: Speculative Execution and Non-Interference  
Preservation for Compiler Transformations**  
[s.van-der-wall@tu-bs.de](mailto:s.van-der-wall@tu-bs.de)





**SNIP**  
 $P \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{d}}}$   $\implies [P] \models \text{SNI}_{\cancel{\text{d}}}$




**SNIP: Speculative Execution and Non-Interference Preservation for Compiler Transformations**  
[s.van-der-wall@tu-bs.de](mailto:s.van-der-wall@tu-bs.de)



**Directive + Leakage determines program counter!**

**Method**


**Lemma**



**Directive + Leakage determines program counter!**

**Method**


**Lemma**



# Directive + Leakage determines program counter!

Method

Lemma




Reason:

if (*i* < size)

# Directive + Leakage determines program counter!

Method

**Lemma**



**Reason:**

if (**i** < **size**)

**Directive**

miss


**Leakage**

BR false

# Directive + Leakage determines program counter!

Method

**Lemma**



**Reason:**

if (**i** < **size**)

**Directive**

miss

**Leakage**


BR false

Combination determines  
Program Counter!

$P$

```
a = buf[i];
a = 0;
```

Define >




Translate Directives

$[P]_{dc}$

```
nop;
a = 0;
```

Equal Source Leakage → Equal Target Leakage



$P$ 

```
a = buf[i];
a = 0;
```

Define &gt;

a	:	11
buf	:	42




a	:	11
buf	:	42


Equal up to  
dead locations

 $[P]_{dc}$ 

```
nop;
a = 0;
```



Translate Directives




Equal Source Leakage → Equal Target Leakage

$P$ 


```
a = buf[i]; d'  
a = 0;
```

 $[P]_{dc}$ 



```
d    nop;  
a = 0;
```



Define &gt;



Equal Source Leakage → Equal Target Leakage

Equal up to  
dead locations $d'$  $d$

$P$ 

```
a = buf[i]; d'  
a = 0;
```


Define &gt;

a	:	11
buf	:	42


a	:	11
buf	:	42

Equal up to  
dead locations $[P]_{dc}$ 

```
d    nop;  
a = 0;
```



Translate Directives



Equal Source Leakage → Equal Target Leakage

 $d'$ 

```
a=buf[i];  
a=b+c;  
buf[i]=a;
```

 $d$

$P$ 

```
a = buf[i]; d'  
a = 0;
```


Define &gt;

a : 11
buf : 42


a : 11
buf : 42

Equal up to  
dead locations $[P]_{dc}$ 

```
d    nop;  
a = 0;
```



Translate Directives



Equal Source Leakage → Equal Target Leakage


$d'$        $d$   
 $a=buf[i];$  step       $a=b+c;$   
 $\text{step}_{\text{oob}}$        $-\cdots-$  step       $\text{nop};$   
 $buf[i]=a;$

$P$ 


```
a = buf[i]; d'  
a = 0;
```

 $[P]_{dc}$ 

```
d    nop;  
a = 0;
```



Translate Directives



Equal Source Leakage → Equal Target Leakage

a : 11
buf : 42

a : 11
buf : 42

Equal up to  
dead locations

$d'$	$d$
$a=buf[i];$ step oob	step nop;
$a=b+c;$ step	step nop;
$buf[i]=a;$ step oob	step nop;

$P$ 

```
a = buf[i]; d'  
a = 0;
```


 $[P]_{dc}$ 

```
d    nop;  
a = 0;
```


Define &gt;

a	:	11
buf	:	42

a	:	11
buf	:	42

Equal up to  
dead locations

Translate Directives



Equal Source Leakage → Equal Target Leakage

	$d'$	$d$
$a=buf[i];$	step oob	step nop;
$a=b+c;$	step	step nop;
$buf[i]=a;$	step oob	step nop;


$P$ 

```
a = buf[i]; d'  
a = 0;
```


 $[P]_{dc}$ 

```
d    nop;  
a = 0;
```

Define &gt;



Translate Directives




Equal Source Leakage → Equal Target Leakage

a : 11
buf : 42

a : 11
buf : 42

Equal up to  
dead locations

$d'$	$d$
$a = \text{buf}[i];$	$\text{step}$
oob	$\text{nop};$
$a = b + c;$	$\text{step}$
	$\text{nop};$
$\text{buf}[i] = a;$	$\text{step}$
oob	$\text{nop};$




$P$ 

```
a = buf[i]; d'  
a = 0;
```


 $[P]_{dc}$ 

```
d    nop; ←  
a = 0;
```

Define &gt;



Translate Directives



Equal Source Leakage → Equal Target Leakage


a : 11
buf : 42

a : 11
buf : 42

Equal up to  
dead locations

$d'$	$d$
$a = \text{buf}[i];$	step
oob	step
$a = b + c;$	step
$\text{buf}[i] = a;$	step
oob	step

→ - - step nop;  
→ - - step nop;  
→ - - step nop;




$P$ 

```
a = buf[i]; d'  
a = 0;
```


 $[P]_{dc}$ 

```
d    nop; ←  
a = 0;
```

Define &gt;



Translate Directives



Equal Source Leakage → Equal Target Leakage

a : 11
buf : 42

a : 11
buf : 42

Equal up to  
dead locations

$d'$	$d$
$a = buf[i];$	step
oob	step
$a = b + c;$	step
$buf[i] = a;$	step
oob	step

-	=	-
↓	↓	↓

step